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For almost 20 years, euro area countries have been sharing a single
currency. The drawbacks of the euro area framework were highlighted by the
widening of imbalances prior to the 2007 financial crisis, and thereafter by the
huge impact of the financial crisis, the public debt crisis in Southern European
countries, and the Great Recession. Prior to and after the crisis, EU institutions
and Member States (MS) have not been able to implement either a common
economic strategy or satisfactory economic policy coordination.
This led neither to a bursting of the euro area, nor to a substantial change in
its functioning. Euro area institutions were adapted, through the European
Stability Mechanism, the Fiscal Treaty, the “first semester”, the European Central
Bank’s support to MS, and the banking union. These adaptations were painful.
In mid-2018, the economic situation had clearly improved at the euro area
level. However, the following question remains unsolved: can the functioning of
the euro area be improved, accounting for divergent situations, interests and
views in MS? 
The paper recalls proposals from EU institutions and from MS. We present
and discuss a number of proposals made by economists to improve the euro
area policy framework: relying on financial markets to control domestic
economic policies, introducing a euro area budget and a minister of finance,
moving towards a federal EU with increased democracy, and last, improving
economic policy coordination.
Keywords: Fiscal policy, policy coordination, EMU governance
1. An earlier draft was prepared for the EUROFRAME Conference, Milan, 8 June 2018. We would
like to thank especially John FitzGerald, the discussant, all participants at the session for their
comments and suggestions, and an anonymous referee. The usual disclaimer applies.
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For almost 20 years, euro area countries have been sharing a single
currency. The drawbacks of the euro area framework were highlighted
by the widening of imbalances prior to the 2008 financial crisis, and
thereafter by the huge impact of the financial crisis, the sovereign debt
crisis in Southern European countries, and the Great Recession. Prior to
and after the crisis, EU institutions and Member States (MS) were
not able to implement either a common economic strategy or satisfac-
tory economic policy coordination (see, for instance, Mathieu and
Sterdyniak, 2014).
This led neither to a break-up of the euro area, nor to a substantial
change in its functioning. Euro area institutions were adapted, through
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the Fiscal Compact (TCSG),
the “European semester”, the European Central Bank’s (ECB) support
to MS, and the banking union. These adaptations were painful:
Southern MS public debt remained under the threat of speculation for
a long time period; economic recovery was delayed by the fiscal
austerity recommended or requested by EU authorities; and several MS
were placed under surveillance. Greece is still in a difficult situation.
This is also the case to a lesser extent for Italy. 
In 2018, the economic situation had clearly improved at the euro area
level: euro area GDP grew by 2.7% in the last quarter of 2017 on a year-
on-year basis, but GDP grew on average by a mere 0.6% per year from
2007 to 2017 (against 2.3% per year in the previous decade). The unem-
ployment rate hit 7.8% in December 2018 (against 7.3% in early 2008,
but 12.2% in early 2013). The scars of the crisis remain: unemployment
rates are still elevated, especially in Greece (+11 percentage points as
compared to 2007), Spain (+6 percentage points), and Italy
(+4.5 percentage points); public debts have risen sharply; income
inequalities and precariousness have risen in many countries; and many
countries (France and the Southern countries) are suffering from de-
industrialisation. 
Can the functioning of the euro area be improved, accounting for
divergent situations, interests and views among MS? Section 1 recalls
proposals from EU institutions and from MS. Section 2 presents and
discusses several proposals made by economists to improve the euro
area policy framework. Some economists rely on financial markets to
control domestic economic policies, some are in favour of the introduc-
tion of both a euro zone budget and a minister of finance, some are in
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favour of moving towards a federal EU with increased democracy, and
last, some advocate better economic policy coordination. 
1. Projects from EU institutions and from Member States 
EU Treaties and reforms implemented since the crisis have led to a
complicated and unsatisfactory euro area architecture. Euro area
economic policy is run by the ECB, a federal institution, by the Euro-
pean Commission (which deals with the whole EU), by the Euro zone
Council and the Eurogroup (two informal intergovernmental bodies),
by the European Council and the Council of the European Union (two
intergovernmental bodies involving non-euro area countries), by the
European Parliament (democratically elected, but at the EU level, and
with limited powers), by the Fiscal Pact and the ESM (which result from
inter-governmental treaties) and, when needed to help and supervise
MS in difficulty, by the quartet of the European Commission, the ECB,
the IMF and the ESM. The main decisions are made through agree-
ments between the European Commission and MS, without any real
democratic debate.
This framework, the financial crisis and the Great Recession,
followed by the debt crisis in Southern economies, have initiated
numerous project reforms of the EMU, by EU institutions, MS, policy
makers and academics. Projects emanating from EU institutions gener-
ally tend to increase their powers. They face reluctance from MS, who
wish to keep their powers and autonomies: Northern MS reject any
increases in EU transfers; smaller countries wish to keep their specificity,
and refuse the hegemony of larger MS. EU institutions generally tend
to place MS under surveillance as concerns macroeconomic manage-
ment or structural reforms, which comes into contradiction with
domestic democratic sovereignty, as can be seen from the Greek crisis
or Brexit. Besides, EU institutions do neither want to question the
Stability and Growth Pact and the Fiscal Compact, nor the absence of
explicit coordination between fiscal and monetary policies. 
1.1. Towards a deep and genuine economic and monetary union?
Several texts by EU institutions (EC, 2012, Van Rompuy et al., 2012,
Juncker et al., 2015) suggest substantial steps towards more federalism:
— “All major economic and fiscal policy choices by a MS should be
subject to deeper coordination, endorsement and surveillance
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process at the EU level”. The possibility of different economic or
social strategies is not accounted for.
— The need for strengthened fiscal discipline is reasserted, together
with the need for ex ante fiscal policy coordination. But, with the
Fiscal Compact requesting fiscal policies to be run in automatic
mode, how coordination could be implemented is unclear.
— The Commission wishes to be entitled to oblige an MS to revise
its budget plans or to modify its budget implementation and to
be entitled to halt EU payments to MS that do not take the
corrective action requested by the Commission. 
— Short-term government borrowing could be mutualised under
the auspices of a European Treasury. But as MS have no problem
to borrow in the short-term, they cannot agree to lose this
freedom.
— The “euro area should have a fiscal capacity to absorb asym-
metric shocks”. Specific discretionary policies should be raised at
the EU level. This is an awkward suggestion, once MS have been
deprived of their ability to implement discretionary fiscal poli-
cies. But MS cannot accept to lose entirely their fiscal autonomy.
— “An insurance mechanism aiming to absorb specific shocks
could be settled within euro area MS, based on output gaps or
unemployment insurance schemes. However, transfers should
be temporary, each MS would be alternatively beneficiaries or
contributors from time to time. This mechanism should neither
introduce moral hazard, nor reduce incentives to implement
structural reforms”. 
— The macroeconomic imbalance procedure should become more
binding and would recommend structural reforms and also
tackle the case of MS with excessive surpluses. 
— A new convergence and competitiveness instrument (CCI)
should be introduced in the EMU. MS would sign an agreement
with the EU, committing to implement structural reforms, which
would allow them to benefit from a financial reward or from
indulgence for their fiscal deficits.
— “[MS] need flexible economies, yet relative price adjustment will
never occur as quickly as exchange rate adjustments. Financial
markets prevent MS to use the fiscal tool. So, euro area countries
need to pool private risks via the banking and financial union. In
the medium term, when economic structures have converged,
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a mechanism of fiscal stabilisation of the euro area as a whole
could be established.” Thus the European Commission recog-
nises that the euro area framework will remain unstable for a
while; many conditions need to be met before setting up a satis-
factory stabilisation mechanism. Business cycle convergence
would be achieved through financial diversification. Should a
country suffer from economic imbalances, this would not be a
problem, since economic agents would hold financial assets
from other MS. However, empirically the economic impact of
this channel is very weak (Clévenot and Duwicquet, 2011). 
— The banking union should be achieved (since the de-nationalisa-
tion of banking systems would lower the risks of financial fragility
and instability). No financial transaction tax (FTT) or separation
between deposit banks and markets and business banks is
suggested.
— The achievement of the capital markets union would be the
priority, as it would facilitate risk diversification and giving SMEs
access to finance (but it is the role of banks to finance SMEs). EU
institutions recognise that eliminating national barriers could
create new financial risks. Therefore, they advocate a single
supervisor for European capital markets.
— The EU should have a single seat at the IMF (although this
request may look surprising, after Greece, Ireland and Portugal
were requested to ask for IMF support during the crisis, which
showed a lack of solidarity and homogeneity in the area).
The proposals to issue Eurobonds guaranteed by all MS as well as
the ECB’s guarantee for public debt were not kept, due to the German
veto of unlimited and unconditional commitments. But it seems diffi-
cult to strengthen the euro area without such commitments. 
On 26 September 2016, the EU Council agreed on the implementa-
tion of National Productivity Boards responsible for the diagnosis and
analysis of productivity and competitiveness developments, which is
problematic in the light of current national institutions of negotiation
and bargaining between social partners. It remains unclear if each
national council will be expected to make recommendations to
improve domestic competitiveness or if, in the case of Germany for
instance, the German council will be expected to recommend substan-
tial wage increases in Germany to reduce intra-area imbalances.
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In May 2017, the Commission published a Reflection paper on the
Deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union. The paper points out
the disagreements between MS in favour of more solidarity and those
claiming more responsibility of each MS; the text recognises the persis-
tence of economic and social divergences, and growth weakness in
some MS, but does not draw any conclusions in terms of global
economic strategy. The text recognises that the euro area architecture
and governance have become complex and difficult to manage. The
reform proposals address mainly three axes: 
— The Commission wishes to complete the banking union by
setting a common fiscal mechanism to support the Single Reso-
lution Fund and the European Insurance Deposits Scheme.
However, some MS refuse any additional solidarity, especially if
unlimited; other MS wish to keep the capacity for rescuing
domestic banks; it would be costly to set up a sufficiently large
fund able to intervene in any event, without “using public
money”. These issues arise only because euro area countries lost
their monetary sovereignty; because there is no clear separation
between deposit and credit banks and market banks; and
because some MS (Greece, Italy, Spain) still suffer from the crisis,
or are condemned to low growth, which weakens their banks. 
— The Commission is proposing the capital markets union, with
the view that firms will have access to more innovative and diver-
sified funding, but the 2007 crisis has shown the risks entailed by
financial innovations and diversification. 
— The Commission suggests lowering the share of public debt hold
by domestic banks, and to consider this debt as risky, which
should have a counterpart in banks’ capital requirement. EU
banks would thus have the incentive to reduce and diversify their
public debt portfolios. Thus, in theory, a government could
restructure public debt without putting domestic banks in
trouble.2 Simultaneously, one or several, synthetic assets would
be introduced, supposed to be safe and relying on government
bonds securitized portfolios. These assets would be owned by
banks or EU financial institutions. Financial engineering would be
relied upon to build and assess such safe portfolios, with senior
2. However, this measure would not have prevented the crisis. In Spain and Ireland, domestic banks held
very little amounts of public debt before the crisis. They have diversified too much away from government
debt to more profitable lending to households (thanks to John FitzGerald for pointing this out).
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tranches containing necessarily a lot of German, Finnish, and
Dutch bonds, and few Italian, Portuguese or Spanish bonds. The
report admits that the two former measures would however lead
banks to reduce the share of government bonds in their balance
sheet, which could “disrupt not only the functioning of their
home financial systems. It would potentially also impact on
financial stability for the euro area as a whole”. Obviously, inte-
rest rate spreads would rise strongly in the euro area if Italian or
Spanish banks were buying huge amounts of Northern coun-
tries’ bonds. 
These proposals would contribute to fragmenting the euro area
between countries considered as safe or unsafe. It would undermine
government borrowing, which would be deprived of a guaranteed
funding by its domestic banks and financial institutions. This fragility
would enhance speculation. Fiscal discipline would rely on financial
markets’ surveillance and on financial engineering, although the 2007
crisis showed the limits of this approach. How would one assess the
probability of events such as a sovereign default by France, Spain or
Italy, which depend not only on the domestic situation but also on the
ECB’s and other MS responses? The Commission seems to try to break
the link between national Treasuries and domestic financial intermedi-
aries, so as to restrict their ability to issue bonds. 
— The text advocates MS convergence, but often confuses conver-
gence, coordination and compliance with arbitrary rules. The
Commission wishes to set “…a strong link between related
reforms, the use of EU funds and access to a potential macroeco-
nomic stabilisation function”. The CCI is again envisaged as
“a dedicated fund to provide incentives to Member States to
carry out reforms”. 
— The text envisages a macroeconomic stabilisation mechanism
for the euro area, under such conditions that it would play a very
limited role: “The function should not lead to permanent trans-
fers, minimise moral hazard, and not duplicate the role of the
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) as crisis management tool.
Access to the stabilisation function should be strictly conditional
on clear criteria and continuous sound policies, in particular
those leading to more convergence within the euro area.
Compliance with EU fiscal rules and the broader economic
surveillance framework should be part of this”. 
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— The EU architecture should be strengthened and more demo-
cratic. However, the text does not suggest the introduction of
euro area specific institutions, but rather hopes that all MS will
join the euro area. The Eurogroup could become an instance of
the Council, with a full-time president. The ESM could become a
European Monetary Fund (EMF), incorporated in the legislative
framework of the Treaties. A euro area Treasury could be in
charge of fiscal and economic surveillance in the euro area, of
managing the macroeconomic stabilisation mechanism, and of
coordinating the issuance of safe European assets. Fiscal rules
could be simplified. 
1.2. A strengthened project?
Recently, the European project was strengthened by four elements.
Since 2015, some economic recovery had been underway in the euro
area. Greece refused to leave the euro area. The UK did not succeed to
define a clear and dynamic Brexit strategy, which discredits the alterna-
tive of leaving the EU. The EU showed unity in both the Greek crisis and
Brexit. In both cases, strong positions won.
Last, the EU strategy has been strengthened by Emmanuel Macron’s
victory in the French Presidential election in 2017. Macron’s projects
for a European overhaul, in particular in his Sorbonne speech
(26 September 2017) attracted a lot of interest in Europe: “The time
when France proposes is back”. 
According to Emmanuel Macron, France, viewed as the “bad pupil”
of the euro area class, should commit to a strict fulfilment of its Euro-
pean commitments, cut its public deficit and implement structural
reforms, to show the euro area that France is a reliable partner.
However, France cannot be blamed for having run policies with
harmful effects for euro area partners: France did not run an excessive
external surplus; domestic competitiveness neither improved nor dete-
riorated strongly; and the French public debt was not subject to
speculative attacks.
In a second stage, renewed trust between France and Germany will
allow them to lead a “group for European overhaul”, i.e. a group of
euro area countries agreeing to move towards a rapid convergence in
fiscal, taxation and social areas.
Emmanuel Macron proposed, in his electoral programme in 2017:
“to create a budget for the euro area with three functions (investments
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for the future, emergency financial assistance and responses to crisis).
Access to this budget will be conditioned on fulfilling common rules in
tax and social areas (to avoid dumping in the euro area). A Minister of
Economy and Finance of the euro area will be responsible for the euro
area budget, under the control of a Parliament of the euro area,
bringing together European parliamentarians of the Member States”.
This budget would be funded by digital and environmental taxation, a
financial transactions tax and a fraction of the corporate income tax
(CIT). It seems unlikely that France may obtain the implementation of a
substantial euro area budget, with an explicit stabilization target, after
having agreed to pass under the “Caudine Forks” of EU constraints. The
risk is that MS should abandon as a counterpart any independent fiscal
policies. The euro area Minister, responsible for stabilization, would
have a right of control on national budgets and could ask for budget
corrections if he considers them not to comply with the treaties. But EU
institutions have always denied the need for and the effectiveness of
fiscal stabilization policies and claimed instead that MS reach full
employment by fiscal consolidation policies and structural reforms. Will
this Minister be able to impose expansionary fiscal policies in countries
running excessive current surpluses? Emmanuel Macron did not clearly
question the fiscal rules of the Maastricht Treaty and of the TSCG.
However, he asked Germany to abandon its “fiscal fetishism”.
Establishing a Parliament of the euro area is supposed to democra-
tize the area, but it would not be possible to complicate the EU
framework by introducing euro area specific institutions.
At the same time, Emmanuel Macron still supports the traditional
French proposals. The European Pillar of social rights should define
minimum levels for health coverage, unemployment insurance and a
minimum wage (taking into account the unequal development of MS).
A common base and harmonisation of CIT rates should be settled to
combat tax optimization, but this proposal will face opposition from
several MS (Ireland, the Netherlands, Belgium). 
The euro area would be split into two, between countries accepting
the renovation project, in particular tax and social convergence, and
those refusing it, which is difficult to imagine, since Europe would then
have three circles, even four if Brexit leads to create around the EU a
circle of countries linked by a customs union. Moreover there is
currently no agreement among EU people (not even among core coun-
tries) to move towards more integration. In the current situation, few
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peoples will agree that their budget, taxation systems and reforms of
their social systems should be decided by a federal body.
Emmanuel Macron has two contradictory positions. On the one
hand he wants to drastically transform the French economy and move
it towards a more liberal functioning. On the other hand, he asks the
other MS to get closer to France, in setting floors for tax rates, social
protection, and minimum wages, and in settling protectionist meas-
ures and industrial policies. 
The Meseberg declaration, signed by Angela Merkel and Emmanuel
Macron on 19 June 2018, is a compromise text. Germany supported
the French proposal to set up a euro area budget to promote “compet-
itiveness, convergence and stability”. However, the size of this budget
is not specified. Expenditure should come in substitution to national
expenditure; public debt reduction remains a priority. It is not said that
this budget could be run in deficit. The stabilisation function would not
mean permanent transfers. Strategic decisions on this budget would
be made by euro area MS, but expenditure would be managed by the
Commission. 
Eight MS (the Netherlands, Finland, Ireland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithu-
ania, Denmark and Sweden), dubbed the New Hanseatic League,
criticized the euro area budget proposal;3 they refuse any increase in
EU expenditure and transfers, and any EU-level taxation, as well as far-
reaching transfers of competence to the European level. For these
countries, the priority is to meet the requirements of existing fiscal rules
and to implement structural reforms at country level. They propose to
complete the single market and the banking union, to develop the
capital markets union (to foster cross-border private risk-sharing).
A framework for sovereign debt restructuring should be explored. The
EU budget should account for budget constraints and provide incen-
tives for structural reforms.
Hence, sharp contradictions remain among MS on many issues.
Some stress the need for macroeconomic coordination, social and tax
harmonisation and solidarity between MS. Others stress the need to
fulfil the current fiscal rules and to accept financial markets’ discipline. A
euro area ministry is considered either as a way to impose fiscal disci-
pline and structural reforms, or as a way to centralise fiscal policies, or
as a coordination instrument for autonomous economic policies.
3. Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg and Malta express similar considerations.
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In June and December 2018, the Eurozone Summits brought
together all EU27 leaders. The principle of strengthening the banking
union was enacted, but in order to meet the German request, the risks
of current national banking systems will have to be reduced before
they are shared. The ESM should establish a credit line, as a safety net
to the Single Resolution Fund, of the same size as the Fund itself. Any
contribution from the ESM to banks should be reimbursed by the
banking sector in three (or possibly five) years. Its introduction, after
2020, will depend on the evolution of risks in national banking sectors.
Political negotiations on the European deposit guarantee scheme could
begin, but its implementation will also depend on risk reduction. The
plan to limit government bonds in banks’ assets and to encourage
banks to hold a securitized asset was not mentioned. Ambitious steps
should be made by mid-2019 for the capital markets union. 
The name and the statute of the ESM will not change. The ESM will
be able to open a credit line to MS in trouble, provided they have run
sound fiscal policies and are not under a macroeconomic imbalance
procedure. The ESM Treaty will oblige introducing a collective action
clause (CAC) in government bonds. Finally, the ESM is supposed to
facilitate dialogue between a MS in trouble and its private creditors,
without a strict obligation of debt restructuring. The ESM and the
Commission will collaborate in assessing the situation and in negoti-
ating measures requested from a MS requesting ESM assistance. The
euro area budget will be a part of the EU budget; its size is not speci-
fied. It will be limited to the competitiveness and convergence
instrument. No agreement was reached on public investment or
macroeconomic stabilization schemes (particularly as concerns unem-
ployment insurance). In short, much ado about nothing. 
One challenge for any major reform (such as implementing transfer
mechanisms between countries in counterpart for increasing EU insti-
tutions’ control of domestic fiscal policies) is that it would require a
change in the Treaties, MS unanimity, and in several countries a
referendum, with no guarantee as to the results, as EU construction is
not currently popular.
2. The debate among economists
Economists have diverging views on European issues. Should MS
live with high public debts or should they try to reduce them? Should
the objective be to place MS under surveillance and to compel them to
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implement structural reforms, to avoid non-cooperative policies
inducing negative externalities, or to facilitate economic policy coordi-
nation? Economists have diverging views on the reliability of national
governments, EU institutions and financial markets, but also on the
political project: should the EU move towards a federal union or remain
a Nation-States union?
2.1. Financial markets supervision? 
Public debts in advanced economies have risen sharply during and
since the 2008 financial crisis. The rise was smaller for the euro area as a
whole than for other economies (the US, the UK, Japan, Table 1). The
rise in public debts was due to developments in finance capitalism and
to the deepness of the crisis, and not to over-expansionary fiscal poli-
cies run before and since the beginning of the crisis (Greece being the
only exception). Public deficits and low interest rates offset insufficient
private demand, which was weakened by the decrease in the wage
share in value added, by the fall (in relative value) of needed invest-
ments, and by a rise in income inequalities. In view of low interest rates
and inflation, current public debt levels are not generating higher
interest rates or any crowding-out effect for private investment. It
would be detrimental for output growth to cut public debts as long as
the reasons why debts rose remain and as long as public debt cuts
cannot be offset by significantly lower interest rates. The euro area
already runs a large current account surplus and cannot expect to be
able to offset a fall in domestic demand by a higher external surplus,
without destabilising the world economy. 
Many economists and policy makers (especially in Germany) rely on
financial markets to ensure fiscal discipline in Europe. The high public
debt levels and the memory of the Greek partial default make it more
likely for public finances to remain under financial market supervision
in the coming years. But this surveillance is unsatisfactory: financial
markets have no macroeconomic perspective; their views are self-
fulfilling, and they are aware of it; they do not try to account for all
information available, but only for elements which are “in the mood of
time”; and they are schizophrenic, requesting simultaneously
economic growth strategies and fiscal consolidation. They have their
own judgement on appropriate economic policies, with a liberal bias.
There is no evidence that financial markets are able to judge public
debt sustainability and the relevance of public deficits. Financial market
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regulation is necessarily imperfect. A country may run an over-expan-
sionary policy for some time, but markets will react only when they
estimate that the debt level is excessive, i.e. too late. Macroeconomic
regulation cannot be restricted to fiscal discipline: markets cannot
oblige countries running too restrictive policies to borrow. Markets
were blind in the case of Greece before 2007, and have been too strict
for Italy and Spain since 2011. 
Letting markets freely set public debt interest rates, according to
their default fears, would maintain arbitrary interest rate spreads in the
EU. It would restrain fiscal policy (a country could be prevented from
running the needed policy, in order to reassure markets), and it would
reduce monetary policy efficiency. On the one hand, the EU would
claim that the Greek case was an exception, and that from now on no
euro area country will default. On the other hand, the EU would rely on
markets to assess how serious MS commitments are. Interest rate
spreads would be arbitrary, costly (should Italy pay each year 1.2% of
its GDP to financial markets to offset an alleged default risk?) and may
Table. Public debts and deficits
% of GDP
Public debt, 
Maastricht criteria Public balance
 2007 2017(and max.) 2007
Highest  deficit 
2007-17 2017
Germany 64 65 (81) 0.2 -4.2 0.9
France 64 97 -2.5 -7.2 -2.6
Italy 100 132 -1.5 -5.3 -2.1
Spain 36 98 (100) 1.9 -10.5 -3.1
The Netherlands 42 58 (68) 0.2 -5.4  0.7
Belgium 87 104 (108) 0.1 -5.4  -1.5
Austria 65 79 (84) -1.4 -5.3 -1.0
Greece 103 180 -6.7 -15.1 -1.2
Portugal 68 126 (131) -3.0 -11.2 -1.4
Finland 34 63 5.1 -3.2  -1.4
Ireland 24 70 (120) 0.3 -32.1 -0.4
Euro area 65 89 (94) -0.6 -6.3  -1.1
UK 44 87 -2.6 -10.1  -2.1
USA 64 108 -3.5 -12.7 -5.0
Japan 183 240 -2.8 -9.8 -4.3
Source: Ameco.
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become self-fulfilling. Conversely, the financial markets’ weight is
considered today by leading classes, Northern countries, and the EU
technocracy as a guarantee against deviating policies, and hence they
refuse to reduce the financial markets’ power.
A country that is keeping monetary sovereignty, and issuing bonds
in its own currency, is of course subject to the financial markets’ judge-
ment, but the effect is different. Markets do not fear government
default, and hence do not anticipate a crisis, but may anticipate a
currency depreciation, which is a normal phenomenon. This will not
inevitably raise interest rates (which would lower growth) but may
induce exchange rate depreciation (which may be expansionary). 
Numerous proposals aim to strengthen financial markets’ surveil-
lance. German economists and policy makers demand that principles of
no-solidarity between MS and no-guarantee by the ECB be re-asserted,
that the possibility for a country to default (and even to exit the euro
area) be explicitly written in EU Treaties, and that a MS supported by
the ESM be automatically obliged to restructure its public debt; so,
strong signals would be sent to financial markets to be more vigilant.
In May 2018, 154 German economists (including Hans-Werner Sinn
and Jürgen Stark) refused a “Europe of liabilities” or a “Europe of trans-
fers”.4 Under the principle of the responsibility of each country, they
refuse an EMF, which would help countries that did not undertake the
necessary reforms; and they refuse a Single Resolution Fund for bank
failures and a European Deposits Insurance Fund, which would relieve
bankers and national supervisory bodies of their responsibilities. They
propose to promote structural reforms, to consider the possibility that
a country leaves the euro area, to declare that public debts are risky.
The ECB should end its programme of buying government securities;
voting rights of the largest MS in ECB bodies should be increased; and
Target2 balances should be regulated. Asymmetric shocks would be
offset by portfolio diversification allowed by the capital markets union. 
Delpla and von Weisäcker (2010) and De Grauwe (2012) had
suggested that public debts be split into two categories: a “blue” debt,
collectively issued and guaranteed, with a ceiling of 60% of GDP for
each MS, and a “red” debt. Each MS would also be allowed to issue a
red debt under its own responsibility. Such a red debt would bear a
high interest rate, which would be a strong disincentive to issue public
4. In an open letter published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.
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debt above 60% of GDP. But the 60% limit is arbitrary. It was breached
since 2007 by almost all euro area countries, for legitimate reasons.
According to us, one should not offer speculators new possibilities to
bet against different kinds of public debt. 
Fourteen German and French economists (Bénassy-Quéré et al.,
2018) published a text on 17 January 2018: “Reconciling risk sharing
with market discipline: A constructive approach to euro area reform”
which recognizes “the persistent financial fragilities” of the euro area,
but in fact proposes to accentuate their causes by weakening even
more the States and by increasing financial markets’ influence. In order
to account for an especially widespread view among German econo-
mists and policy makers, the fourteen economists accept the
strengthening of a so-called “market discipline”, as if markets were not
the ones to be disciplined. These economists make six proposals, which
are in line with the Commission’s views: 
1) Penalise banks having too much debt of their origin country in their assets.
2) Provide a device for an orderly restructuring of public debt. 
Like the Commission, the fourteen economists propose claiming
that euro area MS public debts are risky, that they may be restructured,
and that banks holding these bonds take risks that should be assessed
according to the MS considered. Such a declaration would have three
consequences: public debts would effectively be more fragile, MS
would not be sure to issue safe bonds anymore, and speculation on
public debts would be encouraged. The authors propose bank deposits
to be guaranteed at the EU level, but the insurance premium paid by
banks on these deposits would vary depending on the “specific risks of
the country”.
3) Replace the current fiscal rules by a new simple one (see below).
4) Set up a Fund to help Euro area MS to absorb the most serious
economic crises. 
Countries could benefit from this Fund only if they followed a fiscal
rule defined as in point 3) and the European semester recommenda-
tions. To avoid permanent transfers, this Fund would receive national
contributions, which would rise with previous help received from the
Fund. Thus, countries having previously experienced difficulties would
finance countries currently in difficulty. A country having requested
support from the Fund would pay higher contributions for a long time
period, and so it would hardly be supported. 
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5) Offer investors a synthetic risk-free financial asset alternative to
national public debt (see above). 
6) Reform the institutional architecture of the euro area. 
The paper makes no recommendations on how to improve the
coordination of euro area economic policies, to reduce imbalances
between MS, to launch a large investment programme required by the
ecological transition, to reduce the instability induced by financialisa-
tion, or to refocus the banking and finance sectors’ activity towards
lending to public and productive investment rather than speculating
on public debt. 
The 14 economists’ proposals were criticized by Messori and
Micossi (2018), two Italian economists, with arguments close to ours:
“their proposals heighten the risk of financial instability and weaken
euro area defences against financial shocks”.
2.2. Public debt centralisation? 
A simple solution would be to introduce a European Debt Agency
(EDA), which would issue a common debt for all euro area countries.
This debt would be guaranteed by all MS and would be considered as
safe by financial markets; its market would be broad and liquid, hence
it could be issued at very low interest rates. The proposal of an EDA
may be seen from two different perspectives: either as a way to impose
EU fiscal rules on MS or as a way to ensure MS autonomy in fully
protecting them from financial markets. In the first perspective, the
EDA would supervise domestic fiscal policies and would be entitled to
deny financing to over-lax countries, leading the latter to have to sell
domestic bonds on markets, at higher interest rates. The EDA would
raise the same problems as the SGP, even more strongly. What would
be its democratic and economic legitimacy? What would be its assess-
ment criteria? How would the EDA decide that a country runs an
excessive deficit, if the country considers that such a deficit is necessary
to support domestic output or to rescue domestic banks? Would it
implement rigid automatic rules (a country would be entitled to loans
from the EDA of up to 60% of its GDP) or softer ones (a country would
be entitled to loans from the EDA, except in exceptional circum-
stances)? The EDA would benefit neither virtuous countries (the latter
have no difficulty to borrow) nor countries in difficulty, which the EDA
would refuse to lend to. The EDA makes sense only, in the second
perspective, if it accepts to finance all public debts. Northern countries
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refuse such a system on moral hazard grounds: lax MS would have no
more incentives to cut their public debts.
Schulmeister (2013) suggested the introduction of a European
Monetary Fund (EMF), which would finance MS though issuing euro-
bonds guaranteed by the MS and the ECB. The EMF would maintain
long-term interest rates below GDP growth. Individual MS financing
would not be subject to a numerical constraint, but would be agreed
within the EMF by MS Finance ministers. This proposal hands over to
finance ministers the responsibility of agreeing on public deficit targets
for each country, which is problematic (what should be done in case of
divergent macroeconomic strategies?), and undemocratic (each
finance minister would impose in its national Parliament the fulfilment
of the target set at the European level).
The German Council of Economic Experts (Doluca et al., 2012) had
suggested the introduction of a European Redemption Pact, i.e. a fund
to guarantee the repayment of the share of public debts above 60% of
GDP. Countries with debt exceeding 60% of GDP would place the
share of their debt over 60% of GDP in a Redemption Fund (RF) and, in
counterpart, would transfer irremediably tax revenues allowing for
debt repayment over 25 years. Countries would transfer guarantees to
the fund, such as a fraction of their gold reserves. Moreover, they
would commit to implement structural reform programmes and would
fulfil the Fiscal Pact in bringing rapidly their structural deficit down to
0.5% of GDP. With these guarantees, the fund could borrow at interest
rates without risk premium. The debt-to-GDP ratio would thus fall
rapidly. But the proposal does not address the impacts of these restric-
tive policies on output, making the implicit assumption that the fiscal
multiplier is nil (Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 2014). Similarly, the proposal
does not consider the possibility that euro area economies might go
through slowdown episodes in the next 25 years, which may require
softening the restrictive stance of fiscal policies. The proposal resides on
a postulate: optimal fiscal policy consists in stabilising the structural
deficit at 0.5% of GDP (and hence government debt at 14.3% of GDP
under a nominal GDP growth at 3.5%) and refusing any discretionary
fiscal policy. 
The ESM was introduced through an inter-governmental agreement.
It could be enshrined in the EU Treaties and transformed into an EMF
(European Monetary Fund). According to some authors, the EMF would
control (and impose) that fiscal policies fulfil the SGP and the Fiscal Pact.
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This surveillance would be done via an automatic process, i.e. without
accounting for the economic situation, without any political interven-
tion from MS. MS would entirely lose their fiscal autonomy. In the same
vein, other authors propose introducing a Euro Area Finance and
Economy Minister, a Commission’s vice-president, who would chair the
euro group. The minister would manage a euro area Treasury, to finance
euro area common public spending, macroeconomic stabilisation
spending and transfers within MS. This raises a question of democracy:
how would this minister be appointed: through a democratic political
choice or on the basis of the current technocratic consensus? For some
authors, this ministry should facilitate the coordination of MS economic
policies. For some others, the euro area minister should have the
capacity to oblige countries to modify their budget plans if they are not
in conformity with EU rules. Last, for some other authors, the euro area
ministry would define the policy needed at the euro area level, and then
policies needed at each country level, with no fiscal autonomy for MS,
which is not acceptable from a democratic point of view and is not real-
istic if MS economic situations differ.
Bofinger (2018) wrote: “The monetary union is an unfinished
building with a supranational monetary policy and 19 independent
national fiscal policies. Thus, the only way to make it stable is to go
ahead with political integration. With the transfer of fiscal policy
responsibilities to the supranational level, fiscal discipline of the
member states would be enforced by a democratically legitimised euro
area finance minister and not by myopic financial investors”. But
Bofinger does not explain the principles under which the Minister
would set MS fiscal policy and what would be his democratic legiti-
macy to intervene to impose this fiscal policy on MS. 
3. Changing the fiscal rules?
The SGP and TSCG fiscal rules are arbitrary. They can oblige coun-
tries with insufficient demand to run restrictive fiscal policies, although
the latter cannot be offset by lower interest rates. Fiscal policy should
target employment (keeping it at or bringing it back to a satisfactory
level), while allowing inflation and interest rates to remain at satisfac-
tory levels. According to the functional theory of public finance, public
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debt and deficit should be derived from this target (see Box 1 and
Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 2012), and not from arbitrary rules. 
Box.  Functional theory of public finances
A certain level of government debt and deficit may be necessary to
ensure a satisfactory demand level. If one writes: 
y = a + d + cy - σ (r - g) + k (h - l)    p
.
 = πy    h 
.
= d,  with y, GDP level (in
deviation from potential level), d, public deficit, a, private demand, r,
the interest rate, g, nominal growth trend, h, public debt as a % of
GDP, l the public debt desired by the private sector (when r=g).
Two situations should be distinguished:
The country controls its interest rate. Then full stabilisation can be
obtained without the fiscal tool, with the interest rate: 
r = g + (a + k(h - l)/σ. A negative demand shock or an increase in the
desired public debt allows for an interest rate cut (which can increase
investment, and then growth). A positive demand shock can be offset
by a rise in the interest rate (which is detrimental to investment) or by a
restrictive fiscal policy (which is more relevant). The rule is: fiscal policy
must allow to maintain unemployment at its natural level and an
optimal interest rate. 
In the long run, the debt ratio is stable so: d=0   r=g + k(h-l)/σ. The
country has a trade-off between interest rate and public debt levels.
A restrictive fiscal policy may be implemented if it allows for the interest
rate to decrease. 
The country does not control its interest rate, because the interest
rate is already at 0 or because the country belongs to the euro area,
short term fiscal policy is: d = -a + σ (r - g)
If this policy is implemented and if stabilisation is perfect, there is no link
ex post between the deficit and the output gap, which remains nil. Let us
note also that in this case government borrowing is considered as structural
according to the OECD or the EC methods, which does not make sense. 
In the long run, g = 0 and h = l + σ (r - g)/k. The long-term public debt
level is not arbitrary, but depends on private agents’ wishes: debt must
equal desired debt at the optimal interest rate, i.e. the rate equal to the
growth rate. 
This simple model shows that a fiscal rule like d = d - λy - μ (h - h)
cannot be proposed, since it would not allow for full stabilisation and
since the government cannot set a debt target independently of private
agents’ saving behaviour. The public debt level desired by private
agents is likely to have increased during the crisis, since households wish
to hold fewer risky financial assets and companies wish to deleverage. In
structural terms, population ageing implies that demand for safe public
assets increases. 
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak74
Some economists have proposed accounting tricks to circumvent
SGP rules and the Fiscal Treaty. For instance, not to account for unem-
ployment-related expenditure or public investment in the 3% GDP rule
for the deficit, to set up temporary funds in good times to allow for
higher deficits in bad times, or to introduce a temporary debt in bad
times to be redeemed in good times, etc. According to us, it would be
better to write simply: a public deficit is acceptable if the inflation rate
is below the target, when the interest rate is below the normal level (i.e.
according to the golden rule, potential growth plus the inflation
target), and when the external deficit is below the target.
Claeys et al. (2016) propose that public expenditure (excluding
interest payments, unemployment insurance benefits, exceptional
expenditure, public investment, but including fixed public capital
consumption) may not rise more rapidly than the ECB’s inflation target
(2%) plus medium-term potential growth less a correcting term of
0.02 times the share of the debt above the 60% target. However, a
country may choose to raise its public expenditure if it raises tax reve-
nues at the same time, or to cut tax revenues if public spending is cut
at the same time. This rule is in fact a structural balance rule. A country,
such as France, where public debt stands at 100% of GDP, should set a
target for public expenditure growth 0.8 percentage point below
potential output growth, i.e. it should improve by 0.4 percentage
point each year its primary structural government balance, until its
debt comes down to 60% of GDP. This rule may seem relatively satis-
factory, since it lets automatic stabilisers play, and since it becomes less
binding if inflation is below 2% (1 percentage point of inflation below
the target allows to increase public spending by 1%, i.e. an additional
0.5 percentage point for the structural deficit). But the arbitrary 60% of
GDP target for public debt remains. Should the main objective of
French fiscal policy be to bring debt down to 60% of GDP within
20 years, i.e. to run average primary fiscal surpluses of 2 percentage
points of GDP, when the 60% figure is arbitrary and below debt ratios
in countries outside the euro area? These 2 percentage points could be
better used (for example, for the ecological transition). The impact of
permanent fiscal consolidation on output is not assessed. Discretionary
fiscal policies remain forbidden. The rule does not set an equilibrium
level for the primary fiscal balance and so does not bring debt to a
long-term equilibrium. A country with a 100% of GDP debt ratio and a
primary structural deficit of 1% of GDP will have to increase its primary
structural balance each year. After 18 years (under the assumption that
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the interest rate is equal to output growth), its debt will fall below 60%
of GDP and the primary structural surplus will reach 4.5% of GDP. The
rule gives no indication on what should be done once the debt reaches
60% of GDP: keeping it at that level, which means bringing rapidly the
structural surplus to balance, or maintaining a substantial structural
surplus forever.
Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2018) suggest replacing existing fiscal rules by
a new simple rule: “nominal [public] expenditures should not grow
faster than long-term nominal income (that is, the sum of potential
output growth and expected inflation), and they should grow at a
slower pace in countries that need to pay down their debts.” But the
authors also say that countries would be entitled to raise their expendi-
tures, if they raise their structural tax revenues. The rule is thus
equivalent to: “the structural deficit should remain stable, and even
diminish in countries where the public debt level is too high”. But will a
country be entitled to increase public expenditure or cut taxes to
support output in times of economic slowdown? The rule should
clearly state that discretionary, and defined as temporary, measures are
allowed. Let us assume that a country wishes to promote pension
funds. In the short and medium term this may lead households’ savings
to rise, and, at fixed interest rates and exchange rates, this may require
a rise in the equilibrium structural public deficit. This is not taken into
consideration in the proposed rule. How should excessive debt ratios
be defined, knowing that public debts rose since the crisis because of
the needs of macroeconomic regulation? Then the text says: “If a
country passes a budget with spending above the target, all excessive
spending must be financed by junior sovereign bonds, first to be
restructured in case a debt reduction is deemed necessary”. But the so-
called excessive expenditures should be financed by a guaranteed
public debt, if these reflect the need for output stabilisation. Financial
markets should not be asked to fine countries raising public expendi-
tures even if the latter are needed for macroeconomic stabilisation or
for rescuing banks or companies in a difficult situation. The proposal
relies on an irrelevant financial innovation: advanced economies would
issue sovereign bonds, while announcing there are unsafe assets. No
advanced economy outside the euro area ever did such a thing. How
can it be imagined that a large economy, such as France, may default,
even partially? According to which criteria? The enforcement of the
rule would be done under the control of an independent fiscal
committee, itself supervised by an independent committee at the area
level. Will this authority have to comply with the Commission's esti-
mates and stick blindly to the rule, or will it be able to have its own
estimates and evaluate policy based on macroeconomic relevance?
Besides, like the previous rule, this rule does not have any long-term
stability. It simply tells us: once a satisfactory debt ratio has been
reached, the structural balance may be stable, but its level is not
defined. Any fiscal rule should lead to stable debt and deficit levels
consistent with the macroeconomic equilibrium.
3.1. A euro area fiscal capacity? 
Some economists consider that the euro area could implement
stabilisation mechanisms at the euro area level, managed by a euro
area minister, but this is an illusion, as the European Commission mini-
mizes the size of output gaps (Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 2015), denies
the implementation of discretionary policies and sticks to automatic
fiscal rules. But many shocks or imbalances are country-specific. Imple-
menting stabilisation tools at the euro area level would be dangerous if,
as a counterpart, countries have to abandon stabilisation policies to
bring their structural budget (as measured by the EC) in balance and
should wait for the Commission’s green light to implement a stabilisa-
tion fiscal policy. 
A two-step procedure is often proposed: The Commission would set
the broad fiscal stance of the euro area, and would then verify the
compliance of all MS budgets. But this could make sense only if the
SGP and the Fiscal Treaty were abandoned, and the full-employment
target in the euro area re-affirmed. However, this proposal is irrelevant
if euro area cyclical developments and objectives differ too much. Why
say that fiscal efforts should be neutral in the euro area if countries with
fiscal room for manoeuvre refuse to run expansionary policies, while
countries in depression have to fulfil EU constraints?
Some propose implementing transfers between MS to ensure that
countries in good economic situations finance countries in depression.
Accounting for Northern countries’ reluctance, this system should
avoid permanent transfers, and each country should be in turn a net
contributor or receiver. Can a system on average in balance have a
visible macroeconomic impact? Some propose basing these transfers
on output gap differentials, since, for a given country, the output gap is
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by construction nil over a long time period. But they forget that the
output gap is a vague and unobservable concept, a measure that can
be criticized, and fluctuates over time (Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 2015).
As could be seen after the 2008 crisis, when a crisis occurs at year N,
potential output growth estimates are reduced for year N-1, N-2, …
Should there be re-payments each time the Commission’s estimates
are revised? Should a country in depression wait for EU funds to
support its economy, and meanwhile implement a pro-cyclical restric-
tive policy? Last, potential output growth, according to Commission
estimates, fluctuates very closely with observed output growth, and
hence transfers would necessarily be small. 
Some propose the unification of unemployment insurance systems,
unemployment expenditure being the most pro-cyclical category of
public expenditure. But national systems differ widely from one MS to
another (allowance levels and duration; accounting or not for the
family situation), and in many MS are run by social partners, who
would not agree on a unification done under the Commission‘s leader-
ship. The unemployment concept would have to be standardized
(what about recipients of vocational training, disability pensions, early
retirement schemes, or part-time unemployment schemes?). A country
having made efforts to reduce its unemployment rate would refuse to
pay for countries with high unemployment, blaming these countries
for not having undertaken the necessary reforms. 
Some propose transfers between countries based on the differences
between the observed and the structural unemployment rates. But
how to assess the structural unemployment rate, which according to
the Commission’s estimates varies like the observed unemployment
rate? Transfers based on differences in unemployment rates would
entail permanent transfers between countries. To avoid this, proposals
restrict transfers to unemployment regimes, applying them only to the
newly unemployed and for a limited time period (Dullien, 2017).
Transfers are generally small and become nil if the depression lasts and
hits all euro area MS. Transfers are expected to be nil for each country
in the long term, and thus may have only a limited impact. Others
suggest a reinsurance unemployment system, based on short-term
unemployment developments, normalized according to their past
volatility, with MS contributions depending on the extent to which
they previously resorted to the Fund (Dolls and Lewney, 2017, Aparisi
de Lannoy and Ragot, 2017). Social transfers cannot be based on
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complicated mechanisms, so re-insurance would have no direct impact
on unemployment benefits, but only an ex post impact on the financial
equilibrium of unemployment regimes. 
The proponents of this proposal argue that it would have had stabi-
lisation properties in the past. In particular, Germany would have been
a net beneficiary in the beginning of the 2000s, which assumes that
the other MS would have agreed to pay for the German internal deval-
uation strategy. Also, this system would have softened the recession in
Southern economies after 2010, as if the EU, requesting fiscal austerity,
would have offset it at the same time by unemployment benefit trans-
fers. These authors assume that these transfers would be entirely
consumed by households (Dolls and Lewney, 2017). Let us consider
the case of France. Unemployment benefits were not cut after the
crisis, despite the rise in the public deficit; and they would not have
been larger if the EU mechanism had been in place. At best, the mech-
anism would have reduced the UNEDIC’s financing needs. So, its
impact on activity would have been weak, if not nil. 
Some economists (CAE, 2016) admit that the implementation of
this mechanism requires the convergence of domestic labour markets,
to be implemented by a European minister of labour. But a conver-
gence towards which model and decided by whom? Should labour
market flexibility be promoted (labour contracts revised in perma-
nence, precarious jobs, flexible wages) or a stable labour market
(companies and employees linked with long-term contracts, compa-
nies caring for maintaining their workers’ skills and investing in specific
skills). Should wage flexibility be promoted through wage bargaining
at the company level, or on the contrary through sector agreements or
national agreements based on the “golden rule” of wage growth, i.e.
the inflation target plus average productivity growth in the economy,
as the European Trade Union Confederation recommends? 
3.2. A federal and democratic euro area? 
Some economists recommend a move toward a more and more
federal EU (or euro area). They admit that technocracy currently prevails
in the EU, with a lack of democracy and a liberal bias, but they consider
that a more democratic federalism could be introduced. The euro area
would have a substantial budget and own resources; it could finance EU
common goods (military defence, research, infrastructure, migration
policy), and transfers between countries, both structural and cyclical,
including to deal with all or part of macroeconomic stabilisation. 
Euro area macroeconomics 79
In “Pour un traité de démocratisation de l'Europe”,5 Hennette et al.
(2017) propose a new Treaty. It would establish a Parliamentary
Assembly of the euro area, involving members of the national parlia-
ments and of the European Parliament. This Assembly would supervise
the euro area summit and the Eurogroup. But there is already a Euro-
pean Parliament. It is not realistic to introduce a new structure and
duplicate all EU institutions with euro area institutions. This assembly
would vote the various documents of the European Semester (the
Report on Mechanism Alert, MS Stability Programmes and National
reform programmes, EDP reports), directives, ESM assistance
programmes and Memoranda of Understanding. This would represent
on the one hand many elements that are dealt with at the EU level, and
so the process would duplicate European Parliament activities; and on
the other hand, it would cover fields that are currently domestic prerog-
atives: should EU Parliament members be asked to vote on each MS
Stability programme and National reform programme? The proposal
does not clearly set out the powers that would be attributed to the euro
area, as compared to the EU and to countries. It does not say if the SGP
and the Fiscal Treaty would continue to apply. What would be the
assessment criteria for national budgets: adequacy with the economic
context, or with the Fiscal Treaty? The proposal plans to put public debt
below 60% of GDP in common, which implies necessarily that countries
with debts higher than 60% of GDP launch a redemption process,
without any economic justification. Should unmanageable constraints
be accepted to ensure Germany’s agreement? The authors claim that
their project could be adopted by a subset of member countries, which
makes no sense, given the powers of their new assembly on the Euro-
group. Contrary to what the authors suggest, this Treaty would need to
be ratified by European citizens. According to the project, the Parlia-
ment would manage a common euro area budget. This budget would
be financed by four taxes levied at European level: a corporate income
tax, a high income tax, a high wealth tax and a carbon tax. It would
represent 4% of euro area GDP, of which 2 percentage points would be
used to finance the ecological transition, to host migrants and to finance
higher education, and 2 percentage points would be given back to
national budgets to reduce national taxes and help the poorest. The text
specifies that net transfers between countries would be limited to 0.1%
of GDP, probably to convince Germany, but how would net transfers be
5. Information in English about the proposal may be found at: http://tdem.eu/en/treaty
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measured if taxes and half of the expenses are common? The proposal
does not clearly say whether the euro area budget could be run in deficit
if needed for stabilisation purposes. 
Aglietta and Leron (2017), in La Double démocratie (The twin
democracy), make a proposal for a European budget amounting to
3.5% of GDP, which would finance European common goods (such as
fighting against climate change), would have own resources (such as a
carbon tax and a financial transaction tax), and could issue euro-
bonds. A European Fiscal Agency would assess the economic and fiscal
situations of MS and would make recommendations for necessary
adjustment, which would be determined by a fiscal commission
(bringing together elected national parliament representatives),
adopted by the Council and implemented by MS governments. This
will allow changing the Fiscal Compact. But what principles would
guide this process: debt or deficit criteria, or full-employment targets,
and what scope (how to handle differences in competitiveness)?
Although the second element of the proposal is problematic, the first
element is interesting, setting up a specific field for EU action, with
dedicated funding.
Fourteen European economists (Andor et al., 2018) published a call
for a “democratic renewal of the eurozone”. They propose a jump to
democratic federalism, to a “real European executive that is democrati-
cally accountable before a parliament of the eurozone and leads
economic policy with expertise and a larger degree of political
autonomy”. The call however did not deepen the meaning of democ-
racy in a federal EU: can a population be constrained by decisions
made in a Parliament where its representatives are a minority? How to
account for different interests, situations and institutions in MS? Should
the subsidiarity principle be forgotten? The text suggests the appoint-
ment of a European Commissioner, in charge of fiscal and monetary
affairs for the area, who would chair the Eurogroup and make execu-
tive decisions. But the extent of his/her powers is not defined: would
he/she be able to amend budgets voted by National Parliaments?
Certainly, the Commissioner would be accountable to the euro area
Parliament, but how can one imagine that peoples would agree to
entrust to a foreign Commissioner and to such a Parliament powers
over their budget, public expenditure and their taxation? Moreover, it
is unclear if current budget rules would be maintained. Will the
Commissioner be a watchdog verifying that budgets are consistent
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with the European rules, or a conductor who will coordinate all coun-
tries’ economic policies? For the rest, the project is unrealistic. The euro
area budget should start with a small size, of the order of 1% of GDP,
but it should secure the financial system, and finance a new cohesion
policy for countries facing structural competitiveness problems (educa-
tion, university, training, justice), doing this without duplicating
European structural funds; it should encourage surplus countries to run
social policies; it should finance defence, innovation, and the environ-
ment, and be open to non-euro area members. “While under the
control of the Commission, this budget should, however, sit outside
the EU budget”. This budget would basically duplicate the budget of
the Union, to do what the EU does not currently do. But why would
governments, reluctant to increase the budget of the Union, create a
parallel budget? This budget would be financed by taxes and by
issuing debt, the text saying strangely that it will be a risk-free asset,
“complementing the constrained capacity of MS to issue safe assets.
This will be crucial if member countries were to default on their
national sovereign debt”: the non-guarantee of national public debts is
not questioned. The financial sector is expected to “perform its stabi-
lizing and risk-sharing function”; this is hardly what it has done in the
past. Finally, the text includes the project of a small unemployment
insurance scheme at the euro area level. On the whole, the text offers
little reflection on economic policies coordination, on the linkage
between national and European democracy. 
3.3. A Europe with more solidarity? 
Many economists claim for more solidarity, with more transfers, in
the euro area. According to us, the euro area’s functioning cannot
durably rely on transfers between Northern countries (in good
economic situations and with large current account surpluses) and
Southern countries (with high unemployment rates). Northern coun-
tries’ populations would not accept it. Southern countries cannot offset
bad economic situations with transfers, which would place them under
the control of Northern countries and of the European Commission.
Transfers between countries should take place only in exceptional
circumstances or in the framework of development policies. Each
country should find a satisfactory economic model, which today
requires differentiated strategies. 
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The EU is not a country. There is no European solidarity, contrary to
national solidarity. National characteristics remain, and people are
attached to them. There is no agreement today between MS citizens to
move toward a social Europe, a taxation Europe, a fiscal Europe, a polit-
ical Europe, insofar as this would imply undermining national
institutions. 
Accounting for current disparities in the EU and for the willingness
of EU institutions to cut public expenditure, it may not be obvious to
raise common EU expenditure. Many countries are reluctant, either
because they do not want to pay for the others, or because they want
to keep their national specificities. In military defence, for instance,
France and East European countries may not have the same priorities.
Migration policies differ, due to demographic and labour market pros-
pects. In higher education and research, there is a contradiction
between spending EU funds where they are the most efficient and the
desire of each country to develop them at home. 
The EU hesitates between an intergovernmental functioning and a
federal model, which the Commission and the Parliament tend to
promote. Can we imagine that major economic and social decisions be
made at the EU level, by the Commission, the Council or even the
Parliament, without accounting for national votes and debates? Can we
imagine a federal power that is able to account for domestic specificities
in a EU made of heterogeneous countries? In our view, accounting for
current disparities in the EU, economic policies should be coordinated
between MS and not decided by a central authority. EU institutions
should first show that they are able to implement an efficient strategy,
before the peoples accept to increase powers at the EU level. 
3.4. A Europe with several circles? 
Brexit, the deviations of some Central and Eastern European coun-
tries (Poland, Hungary), and the reluctances of Denmark and Sweden
could be incentives to move towards a EU in several circles.6 The first
circle would include euro area countries agreeing new sovereignty
transfers, and would build a political, social, taxation, and fiscal union.
This would be a step toward a democratic progress: a euro area Parlia-
ment, a EU Commission accountable to the Parliament. The second
circle would include EU countries that would not wish or be able to join
6.  This is what Emmanuel Macron advocates in his speech at the Sorbonne.
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the first circle. Last, a third circle would include countries linked to the
EU with a free-trade agreement: Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Swit-
zerland, as of today, and the UK and other countries (Turkey,
Ukraine…) tomorrow.7
This project raises many problems. The Commission is not in favour
of it because it would undermine the EU move towards “an ever closer
union”. Non-euro area countries are hostile to such a project where
they would be marginalised as “second-class” members. EU institutions
would have to be split between euro area institutions functioning in a
federal mode, and EU institutions continuing to function in a Union of
Member States mode, with a EU Parliament and a euro area Parlia-
ment, EU and euro area commissioners, EU and euro area budget and
financial transfers, etc. There is no certainty that all euro area MS would
wish to be in a first circle where tax and social harmonisation would be
imposed; one would have to choose between accepting compromises
so that Ireland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and the Baltic countries
agree to join or have a euro area itself with two circles. The members of
the third circle would be in an even more difficult situation, if they had
to comply with regulations over which they would have no say. Thus
many issues would have to be tackled four times (at the restricted euro
area, euro area, EU, and free-trade agreement levels). Depending on
the issue, a member state could choose its circle, and it would rapidly
become an “à la carte” Europe. This is hardly compatible with democ-
ratisation at the EU level, which would rapidly require a different
Parliament for each field. Besides, there is no agreement among the
people of the EU, even in the euro area, to move towards a federal
Europe, with all the convergences and losses of democratic control that
this would entail. In the current situation, few peoples will accept that a
federal body decides their budgets, tax systems, and reforms of their
social systems.
3.5. Unconventional proposals
QE for people proponents suggest that the ECB should support
economic activity, by giving a given amount of money to each euro
area citizen each month. This proposal does not make much sense. The
ECB cannot distribute money without a counterpart. This is not the
Central Bank’s role; this is the role of fiscal policy. Such a policy would
7. See proposals by Pisani-Ferry et al. (2016) or Demertzis et al. (2018).
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have to be agreed between MS, and be a transfer payment from
domestic budgets. A bank must have assets equal to liabilities. The
ECB’s balance sheet would be in deficit, i.e. a debt that would be
affected to MS, the ECB’s shareholders, and would come on top of
government debt. 
For the same reason, the proposal asking the Central bank to buy a
substantial amount of public debt, before cancelling them (or keeping
them at a 0 interest rate forever) cannot be implemented. Because this
proposal implies that in counterpart the ECB would issue bonds, hence
transforming government debt into ECB debt (see for instance the
PADRE proposal, by Pâris and Wyplosz, 2014). Here too, the ECB’s
balance sheet would show a deficit, which would be added to govern-
ment debt. The ECB would not pay dividends to MS, but would be
subsidized by them. The savings in terms of interest payments for MS
would be offset by the loss of dividends received from the ECB and
from the amount of the subsidy that would be paid to the ECB. This
would be a mere accounting trick. 
Some consider that a fiscal money should be issued by the govern-
ment and accepted for tax payments (Bossone et al., 2015, Kalinowski et
al., 20178). The government could thus support output, by paying civil
servants, social benefits and suppliers, with this money. However,
contrary to what the proponents of this proposal claim, this money
would be part of the public deficit and debt. The authors do not specify
whether this money would be a full currency, or whether retailers would
be obliged to accept it in payment even for imported products. There is
no guarantee that economic agents would be ready to own it. It would
be either fully convertible (agents would exchange it rapidly for euros as
it would not yield any interest rate); or not convertible, which would
mean that two currencies would circulate, with parallel exchange rates,
a black market, instability risks, and complications for transactions. This
is only a way to circumvent the deficit and debt criteria. 
3.6. Coordinating policies in the EU 
In advanced economies, the system, which worked until 1999 and
still works in the US, the UK and Japan, is based on unity between the
government, the central bank and commercial banks. The central bank
is the lender of last resort for the government and banks. The govern-
8. The project is part of the programme of the new Italian Government under the name of "mini-bots".
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ment can issue sovereign bonds without limit; these bonds are
considered as safe and benefit from as low as possible market interest
rates. This system allows the State to guarantee the banking system.
The introduction of the euro area had led to a hardly manageable
structure. MS need to run more active fiscal policies because they have
lost control over their interest rates and exchange rates. In addition,
since 1973 and even more since 2008, the macroeconomic equilibrium
requires a certain level of public deficit and debt. However, in a single
currency union, current imbalances in one country may affect the other
MS. Therefore, excessive deficits (or surpluses) should be avoided, but
how to define them? Last, financial markets’ current functioning makes
it necessary for public debts to become safe assets again, while at the
same time Northern countries deny giving unlimited guarantees to
their partners. 
Euro area countries should again become able to run the public defi-
cits needed for their macroeconomic stabilisation needs and to issue
safe public debts, at an interest rate controlled by the ECB. The mutual
guarantee of public debts should be entire for countries agreeable to
submitting their economic policy to a coordination process. This coor-
dination cannot consist in fulfilling arbitrary rules. It should be done
through a negotiation process between countries. Coordination should
target GDP growth and full employment; it should account for all
economic variables; and countries should follow an economic policy
strategy allowing them to meet the inflation target (at least to remain
within a target of around 2%, which may be increased in time periods
when a strong recovery is needed), to meet an objective in terms of
wage developments (in the medium-run real wages should grow in line
with labour productivity), and in the short-run adjustment processes
should be implemented by countries where wages have risen too
rapidly, or not sufficiently.9 Internal devaluation strategies (such as
offsetting employers’ social contributions cuts by increases in VAT)
should be implemented only by countries having a specific competi-
tiveness problem. Countries should announce and negotiate their
current account balance targets; and countries running high external
surpluses should agree to lower them or to finance explicitly industrial
9. But the adjustment should not be done through the introduction of an automatic link between
the minimum wage and the current account, as proposed by IAGS (2014). If a country runs of
current account deficit due to a financial or housing bubble, the effort should not bear first on lower
paid workers. 
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projects in Southern economies. The process should always reach
unanimous agreement on a coordinated but differentiated strategy.
The Treaty should maintain an effective process in the event where no
agreement is reached. In that case, the new debt issued by countries
outside the agreement would not be guaranteed, but such a case
should never occur.
The ECB should maintain interest rates below the GDP growth rate
to reduce the public debt burden. Simultaneously, the ECB should give
incentives to banks both to abstain from speculative activities (in
particular by a financial transactions tax and by the separation of
deposit banks from market activities) and to finance productive activi-
ties (especially re-industrialisation and the ecological transition).
National fiscal policies would be facilitated if a European budget
financed public investment and more generally European common
goods (such as fighting against climate change) by common resources
(such as a carbon tax and a financial transaction tax), and by the issu-
ance of euro-bonds. But this should not be a pretext for adding
constraints on national budgets.
Economic policy coordination should not raise difficulties after
negative demand shocks (global or specific); it should not target objec-
tives lacking an economic rationale (such as a structural public balance
in equilibrium or a public debt below 60% of GDP). Coordination may
be harmful for a country having to implement a supply side policy after
a negative supply shock. On the contrary, coordination will be impos-
sible if a group of countries set non-cooperative targets, such as large
competitiveness gains or a large current account surplus. 
Besides, a political choice needs to be made. Does the EU want to
maintain and develop its social model, with its specificity in terms of
social and fiscal systems, with labour rights, and with ecological objec-
tives, or is its project to oblige reluctant countries to accept the
constraints of a liberal globalization? 
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